‘Kill Shia Infidels or They’ll Rape Your Mother, Kill Your Father’: 14-Year-Old IS Suicide Bomber Usaid Barho Reveals To Iraq Police

By Tim Arango

Dec 28, 2014

Before war convulsed his hometown in Syria, Usaid Barho played soccer, loved Jackie Chan movies and adored the beautiful Lebanese pop singer Nancy Ajram. He dreamed of attending college and becoming a doctor.

His life, to say the least, took a detour.

On a recent evening in Baghdad, Usaid, who is 14, approached the gate of a Shiite mosque, unzipped his jacket to show a vest of explosives, and surrendered himself to the guards.

“They seduced us to join the caliphate,” he said several days later in an interview at a secret Iraqi intelligence site where he is being held.

Usaid described how he had been recruited by the Sunni extremists of the Islamic State from a mosque in his hometown, Manbij, near Aleppo. He said he joined the group willingly because “I believed in Islam.”

“They planted the idea in me that Shiites are infidels and we had to kill them,” he said in the interview, which took place in the presence of an Iraqi intelligence official.

If he did not fight, he was told, Shiites would come and rape his mother.

He soon found himself in Iraq, but he quickly had misgivings and wanted to escape. His best chance, he decided, was a risky deception: volunteer to be a suicide bomber so he could surrender to security forces.

The wars in Syria and Iraq have set grim new standards for the exploitation and abuse of children. Thousands of them have been killed or maimed through indiscriminate bombings, in crossfire and, in some cases, executions. Young girls from minority groups, especially Yazidis in Iraq, have been captured as sex slaves by the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL. Young boys have been given rifles and told to staff checkpoints or patrol neighborhoods — or have been recruited, as Usaid was, to become suicide bombers.

In the areas it controls in Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State has established centers for the military and religious training of children, in an effort to indoctrinate them and build a new generation of warriors.

One of the group’s videos, depicting a camp near Mosul, in northern Iraq, calls the children the “cubs of the caliphate.” At the camp — named for the brutal leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who was killed by an American airstrike in 2006 — children are shown doing physical fitness exercises and reciting the Quran, while an instructor explains that they are being trained to fight “hate-filled Shiites.”

The United Nations wrote in a report last month that “ISIS prioritizes children as a vehicle for ensuring long-term loyalty, adherence to their ideology and a cadre of devoted fighters that will see violence as a way of life.”

The United Nations has released a catalogue of horrors inflicted on children by the Islamic State. In Raqqa, Syria, the militants’ de facto capital, the group has gathered children for screenings of execution videos. It has forced children to participate in public stoning. And in many of the group’s grisly execution videos, children are seen among the audience. (Usaid said that his parents did not allow him to attend the public executions in his town, typically held after Friday Prayer.)

In the aftermath of one videotaped beheading in Deir al-Zour, Syria, children are seen playing with the victim’s head and mocking the corpse, according to the SITE Intelligence Group, which monitors the communications of extremist groups.

Referring to past wars and the role of children, Laurent Chapuis, the regional child protection adviser for the Middle East and North Africa for the United Nations Children’s Fund, or Unicef, said: “When it comes to recruitment, in the past, kids were predominantly supporters — messengers or spies. It seems now they are pushed to take a more active role.”

Mr. Chapuis said that all parties in the wars, including pro-government militias in both countries, were guilty of abuses of children. What sets the Islamic State apart, he said, is how “public and aggressive” they are in their exploitation.

Usaid’s account of how he went from a Syrian childhood that he said was not particularly religious to become a jihadist held in an Iraqi cell is one of the few firsthand accounts from an Islamic State child soldier turned defector.

The Iraqi authorities have increasingly showcased Islamic State detainees to the public, as part of a strategy to demonstrate that the government is making progress in the fight, although they have not typically made detainees available for interviews with journalists. The details of Usaid’s personal background could not be independently verified, but his surrender at the mosque gate was captured on cellphone video by a bystander.

First, after the Islamic State took control of his town, Usaid was drawn to the local mosque. “We started being taught that Shiites were raping Sunni women, and that Shiites were killing Sunni men,” he said.

He now says he was brainwashed. But he admitted that he willingly ran away from home one morning on his way to school and joined a training camp in the desert. For about a month, he was put through military training, and he was taught how to shoot an assault rifle and how to storm a building. He had two meals a day, mostly cheese and eggs.

Soon, though, he said, “I noticed things I saw that were different from Islam.”

Back home he saw the group inflict severe punishments on men who were caught smoking cigarettes, yet in the camp, he said, he saw fighters smoking. He said he saw men having sex with other men behind the tents in the desert night. And, he said, he was increasingly put off by “the way they are killing innocent people.”

At the end of the training, he was told his trainers wanted him to go fight in Iraq. He was driven, with other new fighters, in a minibus to Mosul.

There, the recruits were given a choice: be a fighter or a suicide bomber.

“I raised my hand to be a suicide bomber,” he said. That, he figured, would give him the best chance at defecting.

“If I were a fighter and tried to surrender to security forces they might kill me, with my gun in my hand,” he said.

Within a few days, he was taken, along with a German volunteer, on a circuitous journey to Baghdad. He said he was passed from one Islamic State operative to another and stayed at various safe houses along the way — including a photography studio and a house covered by reeds. He spent a week in Falluja, waiting. Finally, he arrived in the early morning at an apartment in Baghdad, where he had tea and kebabs for breakfast.

He was shuttled to another apartment, where he took a nap. Two hours later, he was shaken awake.

“Wake up, wake up, it is time to put your vest on,” he was told.

He was given his target: a Shiite mosque in the neighbourhood of Bayaa.

A few hours later, at dusk, he walked up to the mosque gate.

“I opened up my jacket and said, ‘I have a suicide vest, but I don’t want to blow myself up.’ ”

The chaotic scene that unfolded, as a plainclothes officer snipped off the vest, was captured on cellphone video by a bystander and distributed over social media. “Keep the people away!” one officer yelled.

What happens now to Usaid is unclear. He said he wanted to be reunited with his family in Syria, but the Iraqi authorities have not tried to reach them. The intelligence officer who has been interrogating him said he needed more time to investigate the case.

During the interview, the officer playfully tapped Usaid on the knee and the top of his head, and urged him to eat baklava. “Eat more sweets, they are good for you,” he said.

Usaid said he still planned to become a doctor, and hoped to study in Turkey. He said that he missed his mother, and that the Iraqis had promised to return him to his parents one day.

Before the war, he said: “We were a normal family. It was just a normal life.”

Whether he has a chance at a normal life again depends, in part, on how the Iraqis treat him: as a terrorist or as an exploited child.

During the interview, Usaid was dressed in a gray sweatshirt and cargo pants, and he was not handcuffed. A few days later, though, he appeared on state television in handcuffs and a yellow prison jumpsuit. The television host labeled him a terrorist, and he was made to re-enact his surrender.

Yet Saad Maan, the spokesman for both the Interior Ministry and the Baghdad Operations Command, appeared on Tuesday on state television and described Usaid as a victim of the Islamic State.

And the intelligence officer who has been interrogating Usaid, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the secretive nature of his work, said he and other intelligence agents would oppose any efforts to prosecute Usaid.

“Even if he was brought to court, we would be on his side, because he saved lives,” he said.

Source: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/middle-east/Kill-infidels-or-theyll-rape-your-mother/articleshow/45664478.cms

Also Read:

Under Jihadi Rule, People Don’t Even Have Water, Medicine

The Independent

Dec 28, 2014

ISIS’s vaunted exercise in state-building appears to be crumbling, as living conditions deteriorate across the territories under its control, exposing shortcomings of a group that devotes most of its energies to fighting battles and enforcing strict rules.

Residents say services are collapsing, prices are soaring and medicines are scarce in towns and cities across the “caliphate” that ISIS proclaimed in Iraq and Syria, belying the group’s boasts that it is delivering a model form of governance for Muslims.

Slick videos depicting functioning governing offices and the distribution of aid fail to match the reality of growing deprivation and disorganized, erratic leadership, the residents say. A trumpeted ISIS currency has not materialized, nor have the passports the group promised. Schools barely function, doctors are few and disease is on the rise.

Water has become undrinkable in the Iraqi city of Mosul because supplies of chlorine have dried up, according to a journalist living there, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. Hepatitis was spreading and flour for bread was becoming increasingly scarce, he said. “Life in the city is nearly dead, and it is as though we are living in a giant prison,” he said. In the Syrian city of Raqqa, the group’s self-styled capital, water and electricity are available for no more than three or four hours a day, rubbish piles up uncollected and the city’s poor scavenge for scraps on streets crowded with people hawking anything they can find to sell, residents say.

Videos filmed in secret by an activist group show desperate women and children clamouring for handouts of food, while photographs posted on the internet portray foreign jihadis eating lavish spreads, a disparity that is starting to stir resentment.

Much of the assistance that is being provided comes from Western aid agencies, who discreetly continue to help areas of Syria under ISIS control. The US funds healthcare clinics and provides blankets, plastic sheeting to enable the neediest citizens to weather the winter, according to US officials.

The government workers who help sustain what is left of the crumbling infrastructure, in Syrian as well as Iraqi cities, continue to be paid by the Syrian government, travelling each month to collect their pay from offices in government-controlled areas.

“ISIS doesn’t know how to do this stuff,” the US official said. “When stuff breaks down they get desperate. It doesn’t have a whole lot of engineers and staff to run the cities, so things are breaking down.” There are also signs of falling morale among at least some of the fighters whose expectations of quick and easy victories have been squashed by US-led air strikes. A notice distributed in Raqqa this month called on fighters who were shirking their duties to report to the front lines, and a new police force was created to go house-to-house to root them out.

There is no indication that the hardships are likely to lead to rebellion. Fear of draconian punishments and the absence of alternatives deter citizens from complaining loudly. But the deterioration is undermining at least one important aspect of ISIS’s self-proclaimed identity — as a state, dedicated to reviving the seventh-century caliphate that once ruled the Muslim world.

The group’s momentum on the battlefield has been slowed by the air campaign, which has helped reverse or stall their offensives on numerous fronts, from the town of Kobani in northern Syria to the farmland south of Baghdad. That the group is also failing to deliver services in the areas it does control calls into question the sustainability of its larger ambition. ISIS “is not this invincible monster that can control everything and defeat everyone,” said an activist in the eastern Syrian city of Deir al-Zour, describing the ineffectual delivery of services. “The whole idea that it is organized and an administrative entity is wrongs… just an image.”

It is in Raqqa, the first major city to fall under ISIS control over a year ago, where its governance experiment is cradled, that the discrepancy is perhaps most conspicuous. A Raqqa businessman who moved to Mosul recently said the Iraqi city was in far better shape than his own city, where people were being driven away by the spectre of hunger and devastating government bombing raids that have killed mostly civilians.

Whether ISIS’s administration was ever as capable as it has been portrayed appears to be in doubt. Syrians say those who could afford to flee areas controlled by the group have done so, disproportionately including the professionals and technocrats whose skills are needed to run services.

Source: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/middle-east/Under-jihadi-rule-people-dont-even-have-water-medicine/articleshow/45664495.cms

URL: http://www.newageislam.com/islam,terrorism-and-jihad/tim-arango/-kill-shia-infidels-or-they-ll-rape-your-mother,-kill-your-father—14-year-old-is-suicide-bomber-usaid-barho-reveals-to-iraq-police/d/100725

Protesting Against Apologists

Protesting Against Apologists

By Basil Nabi Malik

December 23, 2014

The alleged Khateeb of the Lal Masjid, Maulana Abdul Aziz, appeared on television in the wake of the horrific attack on the Army Public School, and refused to condemn the Taliban. Such a refusal was met with widespread outrage, resulting in unprecedented protests outside the Lal Masjid in Islamabad. Being led by Mr Jibran Nasir (who on December 22 said he had received a threat from the TTP-JA), the protests have undoubtedly not attracted a huge number of people. However, despite this, the said protests are important for several reasons.

Firstly, these protests have highlighted a disturbing reality, which has been largely ignored by the influential in particular and the public in general. At the time of independence, although somewhat tenuous, the narratives of the state and that of religion, although running parallel, were weaved independently of each other. Over time, and especially in light of the Objectives Resolution, the narratives started over-lapping, and then eventually became one and the same. This was the result of a variety of factors, including the state’s decision to cloak the national narrative in religious clothing so as to preserve a false sense of unity independent of ethnic divisions. Relying increasingly on religion to justify its existence, the clergy gained in stature and influence, whereas the bureaucracy and the political players weakened in authority.

The protests outside Lal Masjid, although limited in nature, represent a realisation in at least a segment of society that Pakistan needs to reclaim the space lost to the clergy. Participants appear to want to “reclaim their mosques”, or have their opinions represented in the narrative of not only the country, but their religion as well. It recognises that as a collective narrative of state and religion has been intentionally manufactured over the years, any actual change in state policy would require civil society to participate in the development of the singular narrative of religion and state. This, although in its infancy, is an important development.

Secondly, the protests are directly taking on Taliban apologists as opposed to simply frothing at the mouth against the actions of the terrorists. Undoubtedly, the state and its people have traditionally maintained a soft corner towards the Taliban. In part, this has been made possible due to the existence of a counter-narrative, which has been eloquently advocated by individuals who may not be a direct threat to any citizen or institution, but are supportive of the extremists’ fringe narrative.

The focus of the protests on the apologists evidences an important shift in the way civil society is viewing the problem. It no longer considers apologists as free from blame. In fact, it puts them in the same boat as that of the Taliban. Their shocking opinions are no longer considered as simply misguided, nor are they willing to tolerate such opinions in the name of fundamental rights. Civil society, rightly or wrongly, recognises the importance of having its own robust narrative and limiting the counter-narrative.

The role of the media here becomes increasingly important. That is exactly what the protests have tried to highlight: that balanced electronic media coverage is missing and needs to be ensured. The initial coverage of the said protests indicated a worrying trend in the electronic media, which appeared ever ready to air the narrative of the likes of Maulana Abdul Aziz, but was seen to be in a state of lethargy and paralysis when it came to the counter-narrative offered by civil society. Although the said narrative did start finding mention in subsequent days, the ability of the Maulana to easily find himself on television shows, whilst Mr Nasir had to resort to Facebook and Twitter to get his message across to the public, showed a distortion in the manner in which the media was covering the events. Though blame can be somewhat attributed to the importance of television ratings, this in no way takes away from the media’s responsibility to be balanced and mindful of its own obligations. All in all, the fact that people have started to realise that the battle for the narrative of Pakistan and its religion is as important as the ongoing battles in Fata, and that society at large cannot win this war without offering a cohesive narrative that it is able defend, is an accomplishment in and of itself. It shows a degree of maturity in our classes and a better understanding of the crisis at hand. It represents a ray of hope in Pakistan, and although this may be a bit premature to say perhaps, it also represents the will of the people to finally change the national discourse on terrorism.

Basil Nabi Malik is a Karachi-based lawyer

Source: http://tribune.com.pk/story/810772/protesting-against-apologists/

URL: http://www.newageislam.com/islam,terrorism-and-jihad/basil-nabi-malik/protesting-against-apologists/d/100641